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During the 1950s and 1 960s, like many people in Western 
Europe, both of us considered aid to the South good per so - 
the more the better. We worked to promote public support 
for it, and to set up aid institutions. We had seen the 
poverty in the South - the hunger, the chronic diseases, 
the overcrowded shacks in both town and country - and we 
hoped that the financial and technical resources of the 
industrial countries could be mobilised to ease this. Aid 
would in due course help create the economic basis for 
social welfare and political democracy.
At that time it was not unrealistic to assume that the 
governments receiving aid were representative, and willing 
to tackle social problems. They just lacked the resources 
to do SO.
Tt is now clear that we were over-optimistic. Economic
progress has been painfully slow in most of Africa and South
Asia. Food production has^ , in many countries, including
most of tropical Africa, fallen behind the rate of population
growtht which remains fast. Governments failed to take 
advantage of cheap oil or booms in export commodities.
Much aid was frittered away, and expensive loans wore
incurred with private banks, leaving a legacy of heavy debt
which has to be serviced and refinanced at high rates of
interest, at a time when oil imports have become much dearer,
and prices of most other commodities have declined.
/liven where economic growth has been rapid, it has rarely proved 
of much benefit to the poor. Their lot has indeed grown 
even worse in many countries, so far as we can judge from the 
very inadeguate statistics aval1able.
Today there is no longer any excuse for believing that 
governments in the South are truly representative. Few can 
face genuine elections. The typical regime is a dictatorship,
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often a military junta, the members of which exploit oppor­
tunities to make personal fortunes for themselves and others 
in the upper classes.
The aim of many ruling elites is not to relieve poverty, 
rather the contrary, to make sure that the incomes of the 
masses are kept low and social services restricted. Even 
in India the government, although elected, follows policies 
which, aggravate inequality. I.and reform is hardly discussed 
any more.
Re i c fi re s s i ve'''/’ policies are often enforced by torture and executions.
In Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala, political 
opponents have "disappeared" by the hundred as the reports 
of Amnesty International show all too clearly. These 
are merely the most conspicuous examples: the disease is
infectious and has been spreading from the Southern Cone 
of Latin America through the Third World.
A distinction mast be made hie tween aid to the economy and aid to 
the poor. We have come to be critical of the former, not _ 
the latter. In fact, we would even be in favour
of increasing aid if there were some way of ensuring
that it would reach those who need it.
The Brandt Report managed to by-pass these issues by confusing 
countries with governments throughout. The Commission also 
exploited, as do many others, the double meaning of aid - as 
a financial transfer and as help. Taken together.these 
confusions enable them to argue that the fact that a country’s 
people are poor and need help automatically justifies 
financial transfers to its government. They avoided discussing 
the internal politics of aid receivers.
But in many countries the problem precisely is the government. 
So it would be strange if providing it with money was any help 
to the poorest classes - any more than payments to the Mafia
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would necessarily help the peasants of Sicily.
Someone living through one of the many reigns of terror in 
the South might well hope that the local dictator (say 
Pinochet or Mobutu or Marcos) received no financial help 
whatever from abroad. He or she could well point out 
that discussion about aid was a convenient way of diverting 
attention from the reeil need, political reform.
In any case, many governments in the South are no longer
short of resources. In nearly all of them, revenues have
grown even more rapidly than their population in the past
three decades - and would have grown faster still if
taxes had been collected properly The majority of
recipient governments
now have enough finance at least to begin meeting the
basic needs of their people if they had a mind to do so. 
r"~'Most also receive enough foreign exchange, especially if we allow for 
bank loans, which have been very heavy.
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‘But a lot of this has been used to import Mercedes cars, tanks, 
fighter 'planes and missiles rather than for development 
purposes. Military spending is on the increase, stimulated 
by competitive salesmanship from arms suppliers.
Much aid has trickled away in bribes and administrative salaries. 
Corruption has become the rule rather than the exception 
thouah it is very rarely mentioned in the documents of aid 
agencies or even the research of development economists.
A good deal of the remaining aid has benefitted big farmers
and merchants.
I
There have been political developments in the North,
which in part account for those in the South. Aid has been 
supported for various reasons. It would be wrong to deny 
that humanitarian motives have played a part. Many of the 
voters in the donor countries have wanted to give aid to 
the poor, as a human response to the pictures of starving
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children. But this has carried little weight in the 
policies of their governments, apart from certain periods in 
Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Britain. In the past few 
years even in these countries this motive has been of 
decreasing consequence.
It is true that most of the aid agencies have committed 
themselves to concentrate aid on the poorest countries. But 
even in these countries, the governments have used much of their 
foreign exchange for large-scale industrial development/ schemes, 
for example the Vietnamese government’s expenditures financed 
by Sweden1s considerable aid programme. In any case the 
agencies have by no means fulfilled this commitment.
On the contrary, political and commercial motives continue to 
play a leading part in official aid. Governments in the 
North have tried to maintain influence overseas, especially in 
the former colonies, partly to secure markets and sources of 
• raw materials, partly for strategic reasons. These aims 
have become increasingly dominant.
Moreover, aid continues typically to be tied (i e can only be 
spent in the donor country). Yet soft loans advocated by
a department of trade to promote exports to a middle-income 
country (e g exports of steel plant) cannot really be considered 
aid at all. Any justification must lie in the donor’s own 
interest, to snatch business from a competitor. Indeed, loans 
for such purposes could well be reduced, to the advantage 
of donors as a whole as well as recipients.
In any case such ’aid’ should be administered on different 
criteria, as should aid to prop up ’friendly’ governments. 
Otherwise there is great danger of confusion of motives: 
decisionmakers may believe that an ill-thought-out economic 
or political benefit to the donor will somehow justify 
providing money for a project of doubtful social value.
We once believed that mu 11i 1 aterala5 less subject to political and 
commercial' bias, but the World Bank and the IMF increasingly 
follow the lead of the big donors, especially the USA. Multi­
lateral support like bilateral, has been witheld from 
elected governments like those of Allende and the younger 
Manley, which were set on social change. (It is unlikely 
that the government of Nicaragua will get much.) And even 
the UN agencies have to assume that dictatorships represent 
their people.
from all sourcesMuch aid/goes in fact to governments that co-operate in the
economic and political strategies of the State Department -
e g Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, South Korea, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Zaire to name
but a few. Except for those of Pakistan and Zaire, their 
resources should be sufficient to relieve poverty if they
wanted to. Yet they do little about social problems and
are amongst the most repressive.
Under present circumstances a very big increase in aid/such 
as has been recommended by the Brandt Commission, would be 
specially dangerous. Much of it would go to help precisely 
those governments. Moreover, much would go also to
others with heavy foreign debts, such as Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Mexico (the first three having particularly 
repressive regimes). If additional funds did become 
available, the reason would be that donor governments had 
decided it was necessary to use public money to achieve 
two aims simultaneously, to save the private banks in the 
North from the consequences of their rash lending policies and 
to strengthen a number of strategically important 
dictatorships«
It does not follow, however, that all aid commitments should be 
abandoned. We cannot ignore the real damage that could be 
brought about in some oil-importing countries in Africa and 
South Asia by the sudden and complete elimination of aid to 
their governments. This would not necessarily be wholly
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at the expense of corrupt officials or big landowners; the 
blow might fall in part at least on the poor, because their 
political defences are so weak, find the social costs could be 
exceptionally severe.
The key to this quandary is to stop talking about aid in general, 
and to distinguish between different types and different 
recipients. The only type that may, in some cases, deserve 
a word meaning help, is aid which the donor is absolutely sure 
will be used for elementary needs, such as pure water or primary 
health care, in a really poor country.
One particular need is for aid to relieve victims of catastrophes 
such as floods, famines and earthquakes. This should be 
administered by new international institutions committed to 
supplying these without any political discrimination; these 
would build up the necessary expertise, make advance arrangements 
for the immediate availability of aircraft, food, etc., and also 
undertake research on the basic causes of such calamities.
It is true that the Brandt Report argued that we could relieve 
our own unemployment problem by a ’massive’ outpouring of aid 
to the South. In the first place, to treat this as a policy 
that rich country governments might seriously consider was 
naive, if not dishonest. But in any case this is a very 
roundabout and uncertain way of solving our own problems -- 
much of the benefit might go to Japan. Besides an argument 
on these grounds provides a justification for continuing to 
use aid as a commercial and political weapon, without thought 
for the social consequences. overseas.
The moral motive is now most evident in the voluntary agencies 
such as OXFAM and the missionary societies, and is perhaps 
best implemented by them. We would once have looked cn these 
as non-professional "do-gooders". They now appear to have 
certain advantages. Their officials, not being civil 
servants, are less vulnerable to diplomatic pressures. They 
can more easily turn down projects like modern factories which 
are obviously much more to do with the interests of the capital
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gccds exporters than the relief of poverty. They can deal 
directly with local authorities, farmers' associations, etc. 
by-passing recipient governments.
Those who clamour for greater quantities of official aid 
might well stop and ask themselves: aid of what type? for
whom? and why? Otherwise they risk satisfying their own 
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